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RELIGION AND THE PUBLIC ORDER. An Annual Review of Church 
and State and of Religion, Law and Society, The Institute of Church 
and State, Villanova University School of Law. Edited by Donald 
A. Giannella. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1964. Pp. x, 
338. $6. 
One of the many anomalies and even mysteries surrounding 
church-state relations in America has been the absence, until very 
recently, of any apparent need for decisional law on church-state 
issues by the United States Supreme Court. From 1790 until 1947, 
this nation resolved virtually all of its problems regarding religion 
and the law without recourse to the nation's highest tribunal. 
In its Everson opinion in 1947,1 the Supreme Court for the first 
time entered the most complex area in the whole range of church-
state problems-the relationship between religion and education. 
In the generation from Everson to the Bible-reading cases in 1963, 
the question of religion and the law became one of the thorniest and 
most emotional issues in contemporary jurisprudence. 
Because of the urgency and importance of America's rapidly de-
veloping church-state problems, all of us are deeply indebted to 
Villanova University School of Law for initiating the publication 
of an annual critical analysis of contemporary church-state statutory 
and decisional law. The first volume in this series, here under review, 
has set a tone of scholarship and ecumenism which will not easily 
be duplicated or maintained. 
1. Everson v. Board of Educ., !J!JO U.S. 1 (1947). 
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Two of the most useful articles of the eleven essays in this 
volume are a summary of church-state literature written by Pro-
fessor Donald A. Giannella of Villanova Law School2 and a com-
prehensive survey of the extra-judicial literature on church and 
state authored by Professor Thomas J. O'Toole of Georgetown 
University Law Center.3 In the former, Professor Giannella devotes 
some seventy-five pages to a summary of all the significant church-
state decisions that were issued in the period from September 1962 
to September 1963; this survey does not, however, deal with the 
decisions relating to Bible-reading and the recitation of prayers in 
public schools since the able Professor Paul G. Kauper of the Uni-
versity of Michigan Law School has a separate and splendid article 
on this one phase of recent church-state controversy4-an article 
which will be discussed later in this review. 
Professor O'Toole's critical analysis of books issued during the 
survey year is a complete and candid review of most of the volumes 
that are relevant to the question of the place of religion in American 
life. Professor O'Toole concludes that, while most of the authors 
now writing about church-state problems are adept in describing 
and dissecting past resolutions of these issues, they do not have this 
same facility when dealing with the problems of disestablishment 
and religious pluralism in contemporary society. 
Each of the other essays in this unique and important annual 
review merits the most careful attention and appraisal. Professor 
Paul Ramsey of Princeton University is the author of an article that 
deals less with the law as such but, in a certain sense, pinpoints 
more than any of the other essays the deepest issues with which 
American law must deal when it seeks to make policy regarding 
morality and religion. In "Marriage Law and Biblical Covenant,"5 
Professor Ramsey perceptively comments on the unexplored and 
· ambiguous role which the state plays when, by granting a divorce, 
it "dissolves" a valid marriage. His insights point to the prospective 
legal controversies which will arise when the contemporary accept-
ance of the many anomalies in American family law is challenged. 
With characteristically critical comments on Protestant thought 
and conduct, Professor Franklin H. Littell of Chicago Theological 
Seminary6 opens fire on "the more turbulent defenders of the old 
Protestant hegemony.''7 In Professor Littell's judgment, the failure 
of Protestant groups to fill the vacuum left by the outlawing of a 
certain Protestant "culture-religion" in American schools may well 
2. Pp. 245-320. 
3. Pp. 218-44. 
4. Pp. 3-40. 
5. Pp. 41-77. 
6. Pp. 78-98. 
7. P. 86. 
January 1965] Recent Books 573 
result in the emergence of "a totalitarian combination of . . . 'non-
sectarian religion,' nationalism and ... racialism."8 The possibility 
of such a "demonic thrust" in America can be inferred "if we ... 
read aright the experience in other so-called Christian nations 
during the last two generations."9 
One of the most searching inquiries in all of recent church-state 
writings is Columbia University Professor Harold Stahmer's essay 
entitled "Defining Religion: Federal Aid and Academic Freedom."10 
Not everyone will agree with Professor Stahmer's conclusion that 
"the principle of neutrality [between government and religion] ... 
has the effect of reading both of the religion clauses of the First 
Amendment in light of the establishment clause at the expense of 
the free exercise clause."11 But it would appear difficult for anyone 
to repudiate Professor Stahmer's assertion that no purely legal defini-
tion of religion can resolve "the question of federal assistance to 
accredited institutions of higher learning since the underlying issue 
involves an undeniable fundamental question of academic free-
dom."12 
Other major essays in this first volume of Villanova's new 
church-state annual review are authorized by Richard L. Robin-
stein,13 Theodore L. Reller,1-1 and Milton R. Konvitz;15 five shorter 
comments are also included. 
The part of this collection that probably makes the most lasting 
contribution to jurisprudential thought on church-state relations 
is the brilliant essay, "Schempp and Sherbert: Studies in Neutrality 
and Accommodation," by one of America's leading authorities on 
the first amendment, Professor Paul G. Kauper.16 
It is not widely known or recognized that the Supreme Court, 
on the very day in June 1963 when it declared Bible-reading in 
public schools to be unconstitutional, also ruled that South Carolina 
could not deny unemployment benefits to a Seventh-day Adventist 
who was unable to secure a job because she could not, in conscience, 
work on Saturday. It is the latter Sherbert11 decision which Professor 
Kauper analyzes along with the more famous Schempp opinion.1s 
Taking these two rulings together, Professor Kauper reasons that 
neither the concept of neutrality nor the "no-aid-to-religion" norm is 
8. P. 87. 
9. Ibid. 
IO. Pp. 116--46. 
11. P. 139. 
12. P. 146. 
13. Pp. 147-69. 
14. Pp. 170-94. 
15. Pp. 99-115. 
16. Pp. 3-40. 
17. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
18. School DisL v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (19b3). 
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a viable test. One must add to these theories the emphasis in Sherbert 
where the Supreme Court required South Carolina to accommodate 
its legislative policy to promote or further religious beliefs, activities 
and interests. The Sherbert ruling, in Professor K.auper's judgment, 
has gone farther than any other decision of the Court "in sustaining 
a claim under the free exercise clause."19 Sherbert, moreover, makes 
it clear "that the Court rejects the notion that the religious factor 
cannot be considered a basis for a legislative classification that results 
in promoting or giving aid to religion."20 
In view, therefore, of the enlargement of the concept of religious 
liberty in Sherbert and the new emphasis on neutrality in Schempp, 
Professor Kauper feels that "facing and realizing the implications 
of Sherbert may prove to be the Court's most important future 
task."21 Professor Kauper does not, however, assert or imply any 
necessary contradiction between Sherbert and Schempp. He asserts 
rather-as the concluding judgment of his essay-that "perhaps the 
ultimate lesson to be drawn from the two cases is that the Court 
regards religious liberty as the central value served by the First 
Amendment's religion clauses and that it is prepared to follow a 
policy of wholesome and benevolent neutrality as the means of best 
serving this value."22 
Only future history will reveal whether benevolent neutrality 
as spelled out in Schempp can adjust to and accommodate the ful-
some religious freedom vindicated in Sherbert. All of us will con-
tinue to be grateful that Villanova will each year present to the 
world a volume containing the best critical views on this enor-
mously important subject. 
19. P. 31. 
20. Pp. 32-33. 
21. P. 40. 
22. Ibid. 
Rev. Robert F. Drinan, S. ]., 
Dean, Boston College Law School 
